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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)

SHANNON DALE STEPHENS,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
Case No. 880600-CA
)District Court Case No. D86-3421
ooOoo

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this Court
as appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2a-3.

This is appeal from a portion of the final

judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, which awards Defendant all interest
in her retirement plan and fails to make distribution of retirement under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, thereby postponing the distribution of the benefits until they are received
or until the Defendant is eligible to retire.

Further, Defendant

appeals from that portion of the Order which finds the value of
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the retirement to be $19,573.00 as of the date of trial in this
matter.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by failing to
enter an Order that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should
be entered to award Plaintiff one-half of the value of
Defendant's retirement plan on the date of entry of the Decree of
Divorce, thereby providing for the distribution of the retirement
funds when available under the pension plan?
The remaining issues presented on appeal require
consideration only if this Court finds that it was not an abuse
of discretion by the Trial Court to fail to enter a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order for distribution of the Defendant's
retirement plan when making division of the assets of the
parties .
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by finding the
present value of Defendant's retirement plan to be the value as
of September 30, 1987 and by failing to grant Defendant's Motion
to Amend the Court's Ruling to value the pension plan as of the
date of the most recent statement of value available, October 23,
1987, or in the alternative to value the plan at its present
market value on the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce,
December 24, 1987.

-2-

STATUTES CONSIDERED
The case considers application of The Retirement Equity
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1986) and specifically Internal Revenue Code Section 414(p) relating to the
Qualified Domestic Relations Order, a copy of which is attached
as Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were married on January 4, 1975.

They separated in February, 1985, and each party filed an action
for divorce, August 25, 1986.

Appellant, Mrs. Stephens' original

Complaint, District Court Civil Number D86-3434, was consolidated
into this action and treated as a Counterclaim.

(Record, Page

16-17, 35-36).
2.

Trial was held in this matter beginning on November

23, 1987, and continued thereafter until trial was concluded.
The Court entered a bench ruling at the conclusion of trial on
December 1, 1987.
3.

At trial Mr. Stephens introduced Exhibit P-40, which

was a quarterly statement of the value of Mrs. Stephens' retirement plan at the close of business on September 30, 1987.

The

value of the pension plan on that date, as shown by Exhibit P-40,
was $19,573.00. (Exhibit P-40).
4. The value of the pension plan at the time the parties
separated was approximately $1,100.00. (Transcript of
Proceedings, Page 168-169, Exhibit D-97).
-3-

5.

Defendant's position at trial was that the pension

should not be included as a part of the marital estate:

However,

if included in the marital estate, it should be divided by a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order because the funds are not
distributable from the plan.

(Transcript of Proceedings, Page

102-104).
6.

Mrs. Stephens believed the value of her pension to

be approximately $15,000.00 at the time of trial.

(Transcript of

Proceedings, Pages 102, 141, 152 and 169).
7.

Mrs. Stephens had requested documents from the plan

administrator to show the current value, but the statement had
not arrived at the time of trial and was not available.
(Transcript of Proceedings, Page 152).
8.

Between the time of the statement of value of the

plan at the end of the third quarter of 1987 was issued by the
administrator and the date of trial there was a significant
decline in the stock market during October 1987.

(Judicial

Notice).
9.

Much of Mrs. Stephens' retirement plan was invested

by the administrator in a stock market portfolio. (Transcript of
Proceedings, Page 169, Record Page 246).
10.

The Court entered its Bench Ruling on December 1,

1987, finding the profit sharing plan to be a marital asset and
awarding it in its entirety to the Defendant without assessing a
value to the plan.
-4-

11.

On December 10, 1987, the Defendant, Mrs. Stephens,

filed a Motion to Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting the Court to Amend the
Judgment made by ruling from the bench on December 1, 1987,
requesting an order that the retirement benefits of the Defendant
should be divided and the distribution of the assets should be
postponed to be paid pursuant to the terms of the plan under a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The relief prayed for relied
upon Bailey v.

Bailey, Utah 70 Adv. Reports 20, (Court of

Appeals, 11/13/87), an opinion which had been issued, but had not
been published, at the time of trial in this matter.

(Record 234

through 236).
12.

Defendant also asked the Court in its Motion to

Amend the Judgment from the bench of December 1, 1987, in the
alternative, to establish a value of the plan as of the most
current statement available, October 23, 1987, which Defendant
had ordered two weeks prior to trial but did not receive until
December 3, 1987.

The Defendant was unable, with reasonable

diligence, to discover and produce at trial a statement of value
which was accurate as of the date this matter was tried.

The

most current statement of value available for the request made
during the week of November 16, 1987, was the statement dated
October 23, 1987.
13.

(Record 235).

The Court entered its Order Denying Defendant's

Motion to Amend the Judgment on December 29, 1987.
-5-

(Record 263).

14.

Each of the parties were granted a Decree of Divorce

against the other dissolving the marriage on December 24, 1987.
All other issues were reserved for the entry of further Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of
Divorce.

(Record Pages 261-262).
15.

On February 10, 1988, the Court entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the final Decree of Divorce in
this matter and found the value of the plan to be $9,573.00.
(Record Pages 274-282, 294-304.

Attached respectively as

Exhibits "Ft" and "C")
16.

Paragraph 5 of the Decree (Transcript Page 278)

awards the entire current value of the Pension to Mrs. Stephens
although the asset is not readily available for distribution and
awards Mr. Stephens other significant assets with liquidity and
accessibility.
17.

The Court entered Findings of Fact generally

referring to the property award and division without making a
specific finding supporting the award of the Pension Plan to Mrs.
Stephens.
18.

(Transcript, Pages 299, 301)
The Court awarded Mr. Stephens $15,750.00 "of the

proceeds of the sale (of the marital domicile) to equalize the
marital estate . . . " before dividing the remaining equity between the parties.
19.

(Transcript Page 279)

On February 18, 1988, the Plaintiff filed a Motion

pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure asking
-6-

for amendments to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce, which Motion was entitled Request for
Additions to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce.

(Record Pages 317-319).
20.

On July 26, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion pursuant

to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the
Decree of Divorce, which was entitled Motion to Conform Decree of
Divorce to Agreement. (Record Pages 355-356).
21.

The Court entered an Order on August 17, 1988,

resolving some of the issues presented by Plaintiff's Motion
which was filed on February 18, 1988.
22.

(Record Pages 367-369).

On September 19, 1988, the Court entered an Order

Amending the Decree of Divorce and Judgment disposing of the
remaining issues raised by Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion and all of
the issues raised by Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment. (Record pages 392-398).
23.

Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter on

October 17, 1988.
24.

(Record Pages 432-433).

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of

the Appeal on November 10, 1988.

This Court entered its Order

that ruling on Plaintiff's Motion is deferred until plenary presentation and consideration of the case on December 15, 1988.
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SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS
1.

Equity requires that the Defendant's pension plan

should be divided by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order which
should be entered to become effective as of the date of the
divorce in this matter, December 24, 1988, to award Plaintiff
one-half of Defendant's retirement plan on that date as an alternate payee.
2.

Equity requires that the division of a pension plan

should always be made by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order,
when payment from that property is deferred, in order to treat
each of the parties equitably when making distribution of the
asset.
3.

If a Qualified Domestic Relations Order is not

entered, then equity requires that the Court leave the record
open to receive evidence of the fair market value of an investment pension plan and that the date of determination of value
should be the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce, in this
case, December 24, 1987.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The award to Mrs. Stephens of her Pension Plan creates
great inequity.

On Mrs. Stephens1 side of the asset column, the

Judge placed an asset which cannot be liquidated without severe
penalty from the Internal Revenue Service and which was intended
to be deferred to retirement.

Liquidity is therefore limited and

the plain practical advantage and usefulness of a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order ignored.
award of $15,750.00 cash to Mr.
tal estate".

The inequity is created by the
Stephens to "equalize the mari-

That cash award to Mr. Stephens in fact creates a

great imbalance in favor of Mr.

Stevens.

Mr. Stephens is awarded a total of $30f250.00 cash while
Mrs. Stephens is awarded essentially no liquid assets.

The

following analysis will show that the award to Mrs. Stephens of
the Pension works a "manifest injustice" which is easily remedied
by employing the Qualified Domestic Relations Order which awards
each one-half of the pension plan and rearranging the other
liquid asset awarded to allow for Mr. and Mrs. Stephens equally
to share in the proceeds of the sale of the marital domicile.
This rearrangement would produce a truly equal distribution
which, from the language of the Decree, is the intent of the
court.

-9-

I.
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE PENSION PLAN BE DISTRIBUTED
PURSUANT TO A QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.
A.

Standard for Review of Property Distributions.

Addressing the general standard for division of marital property,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a
division of properties, it is a perrogative of the court
to make whatever disposition of property as it deems
fair, eguitable and necessary for the protection and
welfare of the parties. [Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d
1080 (Utah 1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235
(Utah 1977); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah
1977); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978)] In
the division of marital property, the trial judge has
wide discretion, and his findings will not be disturbed
unless the record indicates an abuse thereof."
[Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980)]
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980).
On review, a trial court's award of property will not be
disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or ineguity
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.

Turner v. Turner,

649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982).
B. Standard for Awarding and Distributing a Pension
Plan.

Only recently have Utah Courts recognized the necessity of

including pension plan and retirement funds when dividing and
awarding assets in the marital estates.

[Gardner v. Gardner, 73

Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433
(Utah 1982); Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 831-32 (Utah App.
1987); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 204-205 (Utah App.
1987).
-10-

In Woodward v. Woodward, Supra, the issue before the
Utah Supreme Court was whether the trial court had properly
included the husband's government pension plan in the marital
estate.

Affirming the trial court's inclusion in the marital

estate and award of one-half of the retirement benefits to husband and wife, the Supreme Court held "If the rights to those
benefits are acquired during the marriage, then the court must at
least consider those benefits in making an equitable distribution
of the marital assets" Woodward at P.432.
However, once the decision is made to include a pension
plan, additional practical considerations arise before the trial
court.

How to award and divide the pension plan asset becomes a

major consideration in light of the following concern expressed
by the Woodward court:
"Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests
are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and
hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally
strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible. This
goal may be best accomplished, if a present value of the
pension plan is assertainable, by fixing the other
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all appropriate
considerations, including the length of time the
pensionor must survive to enjoy its benefits, to be
satisfied out of other assets leaving all pension bene
fits to the employee himself." [citing Kikkert v.
Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (N.J. 1981)] Woodward, at
p.433.
Subsequent Utah Supreme Court cases have focused on the
immediately preceeding language from Woodward as justifying
awards of alternative assets where other sufficient assets exist

-11-

to justify equalization by the spouse who does not own or participate in the pension plan.

[Gardner v. Gardner, 73 Utah Adv.

Rep. 35, 36 (1988); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App.
1987).
However, the Woodward case, was decided prior to the
enactment of legislation which created the Qualified Domestic
Relations Order which provides that a pension plan can be distributed on a percentage basis by a court order naming an alternative payee who then becomes owner of that portion of the
pension plan and need not have anything to do with the primary
payee of the pension plan (Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PUB. L.
No. 93-97, 98 Stat. 1426 (1986)).

The Utah Court of Appeals has

recognized the significant power of utilizing a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order in concert with the overriding considerations for division given in Woodward, Supra.

The signifi-

cant benefit to divorcing parties which is achieved by the
employment of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order is final
disentanglement of financial affairs while obtaining equitable
distribution when intended i.e. upon retirement.

In Marchant v.

Marchant, the Plaintiff/husband was a federal employee with
significant sums in his government pension plan.

The

Defendant/Wife had been awarded 1/3 of the value of the pension
plan which the trial court decreed could be paid by the husband
over a 10 year period.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
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court holding that the trial court erred when dividing the asset
and should have applied the formula delineated in Woodward.
Marchant, at P.205.
The court stated:
"The concurring opinions suggests that, to avoid 'longlasting financial entaglements' between the parties,
defendant's retirement account should be valued and
cashed out, if at all possible. Federal retirement,
however, presents a different situation. Federal Law
specifically indicates that a decree of divorce, which
provides for a portion of retirement benefits to be paid
to an ex-spouse, will be honored. It is necessary to
conform to the requirements of 5 USC Section 8345 (1986)
and regulations thereunder. Once the delineated procedures have been followed, the monthly retirement payment
is divided accordingly between retiree and ex-spouse by
the office of personnel management and separate payments
are made. There are no 'financial entaglements' between
the couple." Marchant at P.205.
The next occasion when the Court of Appeals recommended
utilization of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order occurred in
Bailey v. Bailey, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1987).

The

Defendant/Spouse was employed as a school teacher and had accrued
approximately $67,000.00 in his retirement fund.

The parties had

accumulated relatively few assets and the estate consisted of
only the pension plan and the parties matrimonial domicile.

The

trial court awarded the pension monies to the husband and the
residence to the wife.

Mr. Bailey appealed the division claiming

that the award to Mrs. Bailey was inequitable in that she
received the only liquid asset while he received only a deferred
asset (the retirement fund).
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In Bailey, the Appellate Court reviewed the principals
regarding distribution of a retirement fund stated in Woodward
and reviewed the cases cited in Woodward and the principals enunciated therein.

The Court of Appeals then referred to Marchant

v. Marchant, stating:
"This court held the trial court errored in distributing
retirement benefits at the time of the divorce rather
than postponing distribution until the benefits are
received. Arguably, Marchant is limited to federal
retirement; yet the policy implications remain the same.
Postponing distribution equalizes the risks and benefits
to both parties. Not only is postponed distribution
generally fairer, it also allows the asset to be used by
both parties in a way and at a time the asset was
intended to be used: for retirement." Bailey at P.21
The Bailey court then recommended the general use of a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order as being the appropriate
resolution for division of pension plans in line with the recommendations stated in Woodward to avoid "financial entaglements".
The court stated:
"In Marchant, there were no direct financial entaglements between the federal retiree and the ex-spouse. In
review of recent federal legislation, the long term
contract between divorced parties need only to be minimal under any retirement program managed by a trustee.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397,
98 Stat. 1426 (1986), created the Qualified Domestic
Relations Order ('QDRO'). When a divorce is granted,
the parties can obtain from the trial court a QDRO. The
Order furnishes instructions to the trustee of a retirement plan and specifies how distribution should be made,
to whom, and when. Although a QDRO cannot order the
payment of the benefit which is not allowed under a particular plan, it can order partial payment to an alternate payee (an ex-spouse, for example). The Retirement
Equity Act also simplifies the tax implications by providing that the person who actually receives the benefits is liable for the taxes. (Citations omitted)"
Bailey at P.21.
-14-

A review of the assets and liabilities awarded the parties by the court reveals the inequality of the award to Mrs.
Stephens.

The net award to Mr. Stephens, obtained by subtracting

liabilities from assets, is $39,147.00 while the net award to
Mrs. Stephens is $41,009.00.

However, Mr. Stephens is awarded

$30,250.00 cash while Mrs. Stephens is awarded no cash.

The only

access Mrs. Stephens has to any cash would be to pre-maturely
liquidate her pension plan for which she would suffer a penalty
plus taking whatever sum was liquidated into account as ordinary
income for income tax purposes.

While the court sought to

"equalize the award" by giving Mr. Stephens the first $15,750.00
in cash after sale of the property, it created a significant inequality by making that award.
The court should have entered a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order awarding Mr. and Mrs. Stephens 50% each of the
pension plan as of the date of the Decree of Divorce and then
should have awarded each party 50% of the sale proceeds of the
house.

The net effect of entering a Qualified Domestic Relations

Order and awarding each party 50% of the sale proceeds would be
that Mr. Stephens would receive net $23,397.00, plus one-half of
the pension plan and one-half of the net proceeds of the sale and
Mrs. Stephens would receive $21,436.00, plus one-half of the pension plan and one-half of the proceeds of sale.

Fashioning the

award in this manner would provide both parties with some cash

-16-

Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:
"In summary, under our interpretation of Woodward, the
distribution of retirement benefits should generally be
postponed until benefits are received or at least until
the earner is eligible to retire. This is particularly
true where there is a sparcity of other divisible
assets." Bailey at P.21.
The clear underlying policy consideration in the line of
cases beginning with Woodward and concluding with Bailey is to
provide for a fair and equitable division of a pension plan
through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order which allows income
to be distributed at the time it was intended, disentagles the
financial relationships of the divorcing parties, and does not
unfairly penalize the pension plan beneficiary with an award of
an illiquid asset.

The case now before the court is a prime

example of a situation where application of these principles
should be employed to prevent a grossly inequitable result, as was
pointed out by the Defendant in her Motion to Amend the Divorce
Decree.
C.

Awarding Mrs. Stephens the Current Value of Her

Pension Plan while Awarding Mr. Stephens other Liquid
Counter-Balancing Marital Assets "Works a Manifest Inequity."
Awarding Mrs. Stephens her pension plan while awarding Mr.
Stephens cash to counter-balance that award fails to follow the
guidelines for division of pension plan assets established by
Woodward, Marchant and Bailey and creates a gross inequity to
Mrs.

Stephens.
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after the sale of the house, and would meet the intent of the
Woodward standard by postponing distribution of the pension plan
until the time when it was originally intended for distribution,
i.e. retirement.

There are no further "financial entanglements"

by making such a division.
Another significant advantage to the Qualified Domestic
Relations Order is obviating the need for providing testimony as
to the value of a pension plan as of the date of Decree of
Divorce.

Where other assets are sufficient to meet the parties

needs, the Qualified Domestic Relations Order avoids the inequitable result which occurred in the case before the court, i.e.
that the pension plan beneficiary was unable to obtain a current
statement of value from the plan administrator and therefore the
court awarded the value of the pension plan as of a date three
months prior to the entry of decree.

In this case, the result is

that the value of the pension plan on the date of the decree,
approximately $15,000.00, is $4,537.00 less than it was on the
date of the last quarterly statement received by Mrs. Stephens.
The inequitable result of the division of marital assets
in this case could have been avoided by entry of the Qualified
Domestic Relations Order.

The Federal Legislation was enacted

specifically for the purpose of avoiding the kind of inequity
which has been created by the Order in this case, i.e. one party
being required to resort to the pension plan asset for cash

-17-

needs, while the other party has significant amounts of cash at
his disposal.

The trial court failed to follow the standards set

by this court in Woodward, Marchant and Bailey, resulting in
severe inequity to Mrs. Stephens.

This court should reverse the

trial court award, and remand requiring entry of a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order directing equal division of the pension
plan on December 24, 1987, and requiring an equal division of
cash proceeds from sale of the home after payment of the
encumbrances as directed by the court.
II.
VALUING THE PENSION PLAN TWO MONTHS
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL IS CLEAR ERROR
A.

Standards for Review of Valuation of Marital Assets.

The Utah Supreme Court has set standards regarding division of
marital property which must be followed by trial courts.

Marital

property must be awarded and divided according to that property
which exists as of the date of marital termination.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 323 (Utah 1980).

Jesperson v.

The valuation of mari-

tal assets will not be disturbed absence a clear abuse of discretion.

Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982).

However,

determinations of the trial court will be altered on review where
the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or there
is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
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substantial and prejudicial error.

English v. English, 565 P.2d

409, 410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
B.

The Record does not Support the Court's Valuation of

the Pension Plan Resulting in Prejudicial Error.

The court's

valuation of Mrs. Stephens' pension plan at $19,537.00 is plain
error.

The court based its valuation upon a quarterly statement

received from the pension plan administrator at the end of the
third quarter of 1987, two months prior to trial (Plaintiff's
Exhibit P-40).

However, the value of the pension plan was

drastically affected by the catastrophy befalling the stock
market during October, 1987.

Mrs. Stephens testified that the

value of the pension plan at the time of trial was approximately
$15,000.00 (Transcript, pp. 102, 141, 159 and 161).
Finding the value of the pension plan to be $19,537.00
as of the date of divorce is inconsistent with other findings of
the trial court.

The initial sentence in paragraph 8 of the

Findings states:

"The court finds that the assets and property

acquired by the parties during the term of the marriage should be
valued as of the time of the divorce."
Transcript p.298)

(Findings of Fact,

Contrary to that determination, the court

enters a value which is at least two months prior to the Decree
of Divorce and is inconsistence with the real evidence.

The pre-

judice to Mrs. Stephens is clear where the court awards to Mr.
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Stephens the sum of $15,750.00 cash from the proceeds of the sale
of the marital domicile "to equalize the marital estate" (Decree,
paragraph 7, record P.279).
CONCLUSION
Awarding Mrs. Stephens the pension plan and valuing the
same at $19,537.00 while awarding Mr. Stephens an additional
$15,750.00 in cash worked a great inequity against Mrs. Stephens.
The court should reverse the trial court, and direct entry of a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order which will direct the plan
administrator to divide equally dividing and equally between the
parties as of December 24, 1987 and equally dividing the proceeds
of the sale of the house to be consistent with Woodward, Marchant
and Bailey.
DATED t h i s

day of F e b r u a r y ,

1989.

LITTLEFIELD ,Sc-PETERSON

^f^^
:G W. PETERSON
ittor/ieys for
Defendant/Appellant

33641-33644
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(A) paragraphs (3), (4), (7), and (16) of section
401(a), and
(B) sections 408(k), 410, 411, 415, and 416.
(4) Time when leased employee is first considered as employee.—In the case of any leased
employee, paragraph (1) shall apply only for purposes of determining whether the pension requirements listed in paragraph (3) are met for periods
after the close of the 1-year period referred to in
paragraph (2); except that years of service for
the recipient shall be determined by taking into
account the entire period for which the leased
employee performed services for the recipient (or
related persons).
(5) Safe harbor.—This subsection shall not apply to any leased employee if such employee is
covered by a plan which is maintained by the
leasing organization if, with respect to such employee, such plan—
(A) is a money purchase pension plan with a
nonintegrated employer contribution rate of at
least Th percent, and
(B) provides for immediate participation and
for full and immediate vesting.
(6) Related persons.—For purposes of this
subsection, the term "related persons" has the
same meaning as when used in section
103(bX6)(C).
(o) Regulations.—The Secretary shall prescribe
such regulations (which may provide rules in addition to the rules contained in subsections (m) and
(n)) as may be necessary to prevent the avoidance of
any employee benefit requirement listed in subsection (m)(4) or (n)(3) through the use of—
(1) separate organizations,
(2) employee leasing, or
(3) other arrangements.
(p) Qualified domestic relations order defined.
—For purposes of this subsection and section
401(a)(13>(1) In general.—
(A) Qualified domestic relations order.
—The term "qualified domestic relations order"
means a domestic relations order—
(i) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable
with respect to a participant under a plan,
and
(ii) with respect to which the requirements
of paragraphs (2) and (3) are met

(B) Domestic relations order.—The term
"domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a
property settlement agreement) which—
(i) relates to the provision of child support,
alimony payments, or marital property rights
to a spouse, child, or other dependent of a
participant, and
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic
relations law (including a community property law).
(2) Order must clearly specify certain facts.
—A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order clearly
specifies— (A) the name and the last known mailing
address (if any) of the participant and the name
and mailing address of each alternate payee
covered by the order,
(B) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the plan to each
such alternate payee, or the manner in which
such amount or percentage is to be determined,
(C) the number of payments or period to
which such order applies, and
(D) each plan to which such order applies.
(3) Order may not alter amount, form, etc., of
benefits.—A domestic relations order meets the
requirements of this paragraph only if such order—
(A) does not require a plan to provide any
type or form of benefit, or any option, not
otherwise provided under the plan,
(B) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits, (determined on the basis of
actuarial value), and
(C) does not require the payment of benefits
to an alternate payee which are required to be
paid to another alternate payee under another
order previously determined to be a qualified
domestic relations order.
(4) Exception for certain payments made after earliest retirement age.—
(A) In general.—In the case of any payment
before a participant has separated from service,
a domestic relations order shall not be treated
as failing to meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) solely because such
order requires that payment of benefits be
made to an alternate payee—
(i) on or after the date on which the participant attains (or would have attained) the
earliest retirement age,
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(ii) as if the participant had retired on the
date on which such payment is to begin under
such order (but taking into account only the
present value of the benefits actually accrued
and not taking into account the present value
of any employer subsidy for early retirement), and
(iii) in any form in which such benefits
may be paid under the plan to the participant
(other than in the form of a joint and survivor
annuity with respect to the alternate payee
and his or her subsequent spouse).
For purposes of clause (ii), the interest rate
assumption used in determining the present
value shall be the interest rate specified in the
plan or, if no rate is specified, 5 percent
(B) Earliest retirement age.—For purposes
of this paragraph, the term "earliest retirement
age" has the meaning given such term by section 417(f)(3), except that in the case of any
defined contribution plan, the earliest retirement age shjall be the date which is 10 years
before the normal retirement age (within the
meaning of section 411(a)(8)).
(5) Treatment of former spouse as surviving
spouse for purposes of determining survivor
benefits.—To the extent provided in any qualified
domestic relations order—
(A) the former spouse of a participant shall
be treated as a surviving spouse of such participant for purposes of sections 401(aXH) and 417,
and
(B) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving spouse shall be treated as meeting the
requirements of section 417(d).
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the
requirements of subsection (a) or (k) of section
401 which prohibit payment of benefits before
termination of employment solely by reason of
payments to an alternate payee pursuant to a
qualified domestic relations order.
(6) Plan procedures with respect to orders.—
(A) Notice and determination by administrator.—In the case of any domestic relations
order received by a plan—
(i) the plan administrator shall promptly
notify the participant and any other alternate
payee of the receipt of such order and the
plan's procedures for determining the qualified status of domestic relations orders, and
(ii) within a reasonable period after receipt
of such order, the plan administrator shall
determine whether such order is a qualified
domestic relations order and notify the partic515
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ipant and each alternate payee of such determination.
(B) Plan to establish reasonable procedures.—Each plan shall establish reasonable
procedures to determine the qualified status of
domestic relations orders and to administer distributions under such qualified orders.
(7) Procedures for period during which determination is being made.—
(A) In general.—During any period in which
the issue of whether a domestic relations order
is a qualified domestic relations order is being
determined (by the plan administrator, by a
court a competent jurisdiction, or otherwise),
the plan administrator shall segregate in a separate account in the plan or in an escrow account the amounts which would have been payable to the alternate payee during such period
if the order had been determined to be a qualified domestic relations order.
(B) Payment to alternate payee if order determined to be qualified domestic relations
order.—If within 18 months the order (or modification thereof) is determined to be a qualified
domestic relations order, the plan administrator
shall pay the segregated amounts (plus any
interest thereon) to the person or persons entitled thereto.
(C) Payment to plan participant in certain
cases.—If within 18 months—
(i) it is determined that the order is not a
qualified domestic relations order, or
(ii) the issue as to whether such order is a
qualified domestic relations order is not resolved,
then the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to
the person or persons who would have been
entitled to such amounts if there had been no
order.
(P) Subsequent determination or order to
be applied prospectively only.—Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic
relations order which is made after the close of
the 18-month period shall be applied prospectively only.
(8) Alternate payee defined.—The term "altera
nate payee" means any spouse, former spouse,
child or other dependent of a participant who is
recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the
benefits payable under a plan with respect to
such participant.
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(9) Consultation with the secretary.—In prescribing regulations under this subsection and
section 401(aX13), the Secretary of Labor shall
consult with the Secretary.
(Added Pub.L. 93-406, Title II, § 1015, Sept 2, 1974, 88
Stat 925, and amended Pub.L 94-455, Title XIX,
§§ 1901(aX64), 1906(bX13XA), Oct 4, 1976, 90 Stat 1775,
1834; Pub.L 95-600, Title I, § 152(d), Nov. 6, 1978, 92
Stat 2799; Pub.L 96-364, Title II, §§ 207, 208(a), Title IV,
§ 407(b), 94 Stat 1288,1289,1305; Pub.L. 96-605, Title II,
§ 201(a), Dec. 28, 1980, 94 Stat 3526, PubL. 96-613,
§ 5(a), Dec. 28,1980, 94 Stat 3580; Pub.L 97-248, Title II,
§§ 240(c), 246(a), 248(a), Sept 3, 1982, 96 Stat 520, 525,
526, Pub L 98-369, Title IV, § 491(d)(26), (27), Title V,
§ 526(aXlXbXD, (dXl), (2), Title VII, § 713(i), July 18,1984,
98 Stat 850, 874, 875, 960; Pub.L. 98-397, Title II,
§ 2041(b), Aug. 23, 1984, 98 Stat 1445.)
l See Codification notes set out below

of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, which
was approved Sept 26, 1980
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment Amendment by Pub L. 98-397,
applicable to plan years beginning after December 31, 1984, except as
otherwise provided in sections 302(b), (c), (d) and 303 of Pub.L. 98-397,
pursuant to section 302(a) of Pub L. 98-397
Amendment by section 491(d)(26)f (27) of Pub L. 98-369 applicable
to obligations issued after Dec 31, 1983, pursuant to section 491(0(1) of
PubL. 98-369
Section 526(bX2) of Pub L. 98-369 provided that "The amendment
made by this subsection [amending subsec (nX2) of this section] shall
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983 "
Section 526(dX3) of Pub L. 98-369 provided that "The amendments
made by this subsection [enacting subsec (o) of this section and
repealing subsec (mX6) of this title] shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act [July 18, 1984]"
Amendment by section 713(i) of Pub L. 98-369, except where otherwise provided, effective as if included in provision of Pub L. 97-248, The
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, to which the amendment relates, pursuant to section 715 of Pub L. 98-369

Editorial Notes
Codification. Par (5) of subsec (m), relating to definitions, and par
(6) of subsec (m), relating to regulations, were redesignated as pars (6)
and (7), respectively, by Pub L 97-248, Title II, § 246(a), Sept 3, 1982,
96 Stat 525, effective after Dec 31, 1983
Section 526(dX2) and (3) of Pub L 98-369 purported to repeal par
(6) of subsec (m) effective on July 18, 1984 This repeal was not
executed to par (6) as redesignated from par (5) in that the probable
intent of Congress was to repeal par (7) as redesignated from par (6)
Since section 526(dXO of PubL 98-369 added a new subsec (o)
relating to regulations, it appears that par (7), relating to regulations, as
redesignated from par (6), was the paragraph intended to be repealed
Both Pub L 96-605 and Pub L 96-613 provided for the addition of
subsec (m) of this section PubL 96-605, § 201(c), and PubL
96-613, § 5(c), provided, in identical language, that the subsec (m) of
this section thus added is applicable to plan years ending after Nov 30,
1980, with an added provision that, in the case of a plan in existence on
Nov 30, 1980, the subsec (m) thus added shall apply to plan years
beginning after Nov 30, 1980
References in Text Railroad Retirement Act of 1935 or 1937,
referred to in subsec (d), is classified to 45 U S C A § 228 et seq
International Organizations Immunities Act, referred to in subsec (d),
is classified to 22 U S C A § 288 et seq
The Employee Retirement Income Secunty Act of 1974, referred to in
subsecs. (f)(3), (5) and (/), is Pub L 93-406, Sept 2, 1974, 88 Stat 832,
as amended Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Secunty Act
of 1974 is classified to section 1301 et seq of U S C A Title 29, Labor
Section 3(37XAKiu) of the Employee Retirement Income Secunty Act of
1974 is classified to section 1002(37XAXm) of U S C A Title 29
Section 4403(b) and (c) of the Employee Retirement Income Secunty
Act of 1974 probably means section 4303(b) and (c) of such Act which
is classified to section 1453(b) and (c) of U S C A Title 29
The date of the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, referred to in subsec (fX4) and (5), means
the date of the enactment of Pub L. 96-364, which was approved Sept
26, 1980

Effective Date of 1982 Amendment Amendment by section 240(c) of
PubL. 97-248 applicable to years beginning after Dec 31, 1983,
pursuant to section 241(a) of Pub L. 97-248
Section 246(b) of Pub L. 97-248 provided that "The amendments
made by subsection (a) [amending subsec (m) of this section] shall apply
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983 "
Section 248(b) of Pub L. 97-248 provided that "The amendment
made by subsection (a) [enacting subsec (n)J shall apply to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1983 "
Effective Date of 1980 Amendments. Section 201(c) of Pub L 96605 and section 5(c) of Pub L 96-613 provided that
"(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 105 and
125 of this title] shall apply to plan years ending after November 30,
1980
"(2) Plans in existence on November 30,1980.—In the case of a plan
in existence on November 30, 1980, the amendments made by this
section [amending this section and sections 105 and 125 of this title]
shall apply to plan years beginning after November 30, 1980"
Section 407(c) of Pub L. 96-364 provided that "The amendments
made by this section [amending subsec (e) of this section and section
1002(33) of Title 29, Labor] shall be effective as of January 1, 1974 "
Amendment of subsecs (0 and (/) by Pub L 96-364 effective, except
as specifically provided, Sept 26, 1980, pursuant to section 210 of
Pub L. 96-364
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment Amendment of subsecs. (b), (c)
of this section by section 152(d) of Pub L 95-600 applicable to taxable
years beginning after Dec 31, 1978, pursuant to section 152(h) of Pub L.
95-600
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Effective date of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980, referred to in subsec (0(5), probably means the date of enactment
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limitations on benefits and contribution under qualified plans

(a) General rule.—
(1) Trusts.—A trust which is a part of a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan shall not

EXHIBIT "B"

FiLiZD JkJr?..

FTP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD VUUlClkL

;-3 OFFICE

i r« ""ipn

fat^l&CTT
T^uiy Usr*

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. D-86-3421
vs.
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS,
Defendant.

The above matter came before the Court for trial on Monday,
the 23rd day of November, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., and
continuing

thereafter

until

Daniels, Judge presiding.

concluded,

the

Honorable

Scott

The plaintiff was present in person

and represented by counsel, Ellen Maycock.

The defendant was

present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson.
The

Court

having

received

the

testimony

of

the

witnesses

presented, having reviewed the exhibits received into evidence,
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having received the
arguments of counsel, and now being well advised in the premises,
does enter its Findings of Fact, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Lake

The parties herein were bona fide residents of Salt

County,

State

of

Utah,

for

more

than

three

months

immediately preceding the filing of this action for divorce.
2.

During the term of the marriage, the parties commenced

to argue continuously such that they separated in February, 1985,
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and have lived separate and apart since that date, they are no
longer in love with each other and cannot remain married to each
other.
3.

During the marriage, there have been two children born

as issue, to wit:
4.

McKinley Stephens, and McCall Stephens,

At the conclusion of trial on November 23, 1987, the

parties entered into an agreement regarding the issues of custody
and visitation which was received by the Court.
agreed

The parties

that the defendant will be awarded the permanent care,

custody and control of the minor children of the parties, subject
to

parental

rights

and

visitation

being

reserved

in

the

plaintiff, as follows:
(a)

Plaintiff shall have the right of visitation every

other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.;
every Thursday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; and one additional
day every other week from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., with plaintiff
to pick up the children from day care on those weekdays.
(b)

Every other holiday on New Year's Day, President's

Day, Martin Luther King's birthday, Memorial Day,

Independence

Day, Pioneer Day and Labor Day.

entitled

(c)

Father's Day each year.

(d)

In every odd-numbered year, the plaintiff shall be

to exercise visitation

for the Thanksgiving

holidays

from Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and for
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Easter or spring vacation from 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the
commencement of the holiday to 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the
children's return to school.
(e)

Plaintiff

shall

be

entitled

Christmas Day from 12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

to

visitation

on

The plaintiff shall

also have visitation for one-half of the Christmas holidays which
will be December 26th at 9:00 a.m. through December 29th at 6:00
p.m., or December 30th at 9:00 a.m. through January 2nd at 6:00
p.m.

(unless January

2nd is a school day, in which event the

visitation shall conclude on January 1st at 6:00 p.m.)

In the

years in which plaintiff has visitation beginning December 26thf
the children shall remain with him for Christmas Day through his
visitation

period.

The

holiday

visitation

shall

be

divided

between the parties so that each of them will exercise the latter
half of the holiday visitation to coincide with their exercise of
the New Year's Day holiday with the children.
(f)
visitation

Plaintiff shall be entitled to exercise extended

with

the

children

for

two

weeks

on

two

occasions

during the children's summer vacation from school.
(g)

When the children are out of school for recess at

times other than those already specifically mentioned (i.e., UEA
break, deer hunt), plaintiff shall have preference over day care
for care of the children during the day time for such school
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recess if the defendant plans on using day care during those
times.
(h) When defendant travels the plaintiff shall have
the option to be first alternative to care for the children
during

such

travel

by

the

defendant.

Defendant

will make

reasonable efforts to provide reasonable notice to plaintiff of
her travel plans.
(i)

Defendant shall make provision for the plaintiff

to participate in elective medical decisions for the benefit of
the children.

Plaintifffs attendance at school programs and

parent/teacher conferences and his participation or attendance at
the children•s social activities, i.e., dance recitals, sports
activities.
(j)

Each of the parties shall be enjoined from saying

anything to anyone to undermine the authority of the other parent
over the children.
5.

The Court finds that the amount of $225.00 per child

per month is a fair figure for half of the costs of raising the
minor

children at this level and standard of living.

This

finding is not based on the fact that one party can afford the
cost of supporting the children more than the other party, but
based on the finding that the fair cost of raising a child at
this standard of living is $450.00 per month per child.

Further,

the Court finds that each of the parties should be awarded the
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right to claim one of the children as an exemption for purposes
of federal and state income tax reporting and that after one of
the children reaches the age of majority, then the remaining
exemption should be alternated between them annually.
6.

Health

and

dental

insurance

will

continue

to

be

provided by the defendant through her place of employment for the
benefit of the minor children for so long as it is available.

If

health and dental insurance should become unavailable to the
defendantf then the parties will equally divide the cost of
keeping the children insured on a policy of health and dental
insurance.

The parties will each be required to pay one-half of

the medical and dental costs which are not covered by insurance.
7.

Each of the parties are able to support themselves, and

an award of alimony is not required in this matter.
8.

The Court finds that the assets and property acquired

by the parties during the term of the marriage should be valued
as of the time of divorce.

In making a division and valuation,

the Court has taken into consideration the fact that there are
substantial properties and the changing values of the property
during the course of litigation from the time of separation until
the

time

of

consideration

trial
the

fact

in

this

matter;

further

that plaintiff has

taking

into

sold some of the

assets, including an automobile and some paintings, that the
defendant received a tax refund, a portion of which should have
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been plaintiff's, and that defendant spent the tax refund money;
and considering that the defendant should owe a little bit more
in support, the Court does find that the marital estate consists
of assets and liabilities which should be awarded to each of the
parties or ordered to be paid by each of them based upon values,
as follows:
ASSETS
Item

Plaintiff

Linden Avenue
Maple Hills
Reeves Terrace No. 1
Reeves Terrace No. 2
Iron Blossom Lodge
Park City

$45,000.00

Defendant
$45,000.00

21,500.00
15,000.00
3,000.00
52,000.00

Household furnishings

10,671.00

1986 Isuzu
1982 Volkswagen
Sailboat
Jet Ski
Trailer
Snowplow

10,175.00

11,225.00
-01,600.00
1,400.00

Pension
Tax refunds (1985 & 1986)

19,573.00
-0-

BMW sale
Toyota sale
Cash in escrow
Cash to plaintiff

14,500.00
15,750.00
LIABILITIES

Item

Plaintiff

Richard E. Stephens
CFS (Linden first mortgage)

$ 8,000.00
32,455.00

Defendant
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Plaintiff

Mays (Linden second mortgage)
Utah State Credit Union
(Reeves No. 1)
N. Solomon (Maple Hills first)
Utah State Credit Union (Isuzu)
E. Reynolds (Park City)
LSI Trust (Reeves Terrace #2)
R.E. Stephens
J. Miller (Volkswagen)
N. Solomon (cash to plaintiff)
Cottonwood Security Bank
(plaintiff's overdraft)
Cottonwood Security Bank
(defendant•s overdraft)
Credit cards (plaintiff's
personal charges)
Property taxes
9.

Based

on

the

Defendant

4,064.00
21,175.00
$34,348.00
7f790.00
48f881.00
14,947.00
860.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
1,769.00
1,441.00
1,964.00
3,544.00

foregoing

division

of

assets

and

liabilities, the Court finds that the defendant has received a
considerable amount more of the assets of the marital estate.
The Court finds that the marital residence on Gundersen Lane
should be sold, with the area rugs to be included in the sale and
the proceeds should be used to equalize the division of the
marital estate.
will be paid

After payment of the first mortgage, the equity
first

for the expenses of sale, including any

expenses of the defendant to make the house ready for sale, plus
real estate fees and all closing costs.
be reimbursed

for counseling

Second, defendant will

fees in the amount of $300.00.

Then, the outstanding liability owed to Joe and Wanda May for a
promissory note signed by the defendant shall be paid.

Until

such time as the Mays are paid, the parties should be required to
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execute a trust deed on the Gundersen Lane property as security
for that outstanding debt.

Following payment to the Mays, the

plaintiff shall then receive the first $15,750.00 of the proceeds
of the sale to equalize the marital estate and any balance
remaining thereafter will be divided equally between the parties.
10.

The Court finds that until the Gundersen Lane property

is sold, it should continue to be used by the defendant as her
residence and she will make all payments, pay all utilities and
receive the rents from said property.

The defendant will be

responsible for the sale of the property, both listing it and
selling it.

The defendant may sell the property at any price

that she finds reasonable; however, the plaintiff should have the
right of first refusal in the event defendant attempts to sell
the home

for too low a price, plaintiff will then have an

opportunity to buy it at the price for which defendant intends to
sell it.
11.

The Court finds that the division of the assets should

not be made only by specific dollar amount, but based upon what
the Court considers equitable in the circumstances.

The Court

has paid attention to the value of the assets in making its
division, but has not necessarily made the determination for the
distribution of assets based upon what the parties presented as
value.

The Court, in making its consideration, has determined
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that the defendant should be awarded the present cash value of
her retirement plan,
12.

The

furniture,

furnishings

and

fixtures

and

other

personal property should be awarded to each of the parties as
they have divided it, except that the rosewood hutch should be
delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the desk and
credenza should be delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant.
The defendant will also receive the needlepoint seat which she
made, but the plaintiff will be entitled to retain the rocker.
The defendant should receive the walnut frames.

The roll-top

desk should be sold immediately and the proceeds from the sale
divided equally between the parties.
of the

Duplicates should be made

slides and photographs in possession of each of the

parties, and each of them should be ordered to divide equally the
cost of preparing the duplicates.
13.

The parties should share equally in any recovery from

the Larsen Judgment, and each of them should be directed to pay
one-half of the attorney's fees incurred for obtaining and/or
collecting the Judgment.
14.

The defendant should be awarded Judgment for past due

child support in the amount of $450.00 through November 30, 1987.
15.
costs

and

Each of the parties have the ability to pay their own
attorney's

fees which they have

incurred

in this

matter, except that the Court finds that the necessity of having
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two hearings on the issue of plaintiff's transfer of title to the
Maple Hills property was not necessary, and the defendant should
be

directed

to pay

attorney's fees.

$350.00

for

the benefit

of plaintifffs

The payment of said $350.00 attorney's fees

should be made from the distribution of the proceeds of the sale
to plaintiff prior to dividing the shares between the parties.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Factf this Court does
enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law, as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court does have jurisdiction to enter a Decree of

Divorce in this matter.
2.

A Decree of Divorce should be awarded to each of the

parties mutually upon the grounds that they have each treated the
other

cruelly,

causing

great

mental

distress,

and

making

continuation of the marriage relationship impossible.
3.

The defendant should be awarded the permanent care,

custody and control of the minor children of the parties, subject
to the reservation of certain parental rights and visitation
being reserved in the plaintiff as agreed upon by the parties.
4.

The plaintiff should be ordered to pay to the defendant

the sum of $225.00 per month per child as child support for the
benefit of the minor children of the parties.
5.

The defendant should be ordered to maintain health and

dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the
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available

through

her

place

of

In the event health and dental insurance should no

longer be available through defendant's place of employment, each
of the parties should be directed to pay one-half of any costs of
health and dental insurance.

Each of the parties should be

ordered to pay one-half of any and all costs for health and
dental care which are not paid for by insurance benefits.
6.

A permanent injunction should enter enjoining each of

the parties from undermining the authority of the other regarding
the children's behavior, from involving the children in their
disputes, and making the preliminary injunction heretofore issued
In this matter a permanent injunction.
7.

There should be no award of alimony in this matter.

8.

An order should be entered making division of the

Marital

estate

and

making

provision

for

the

payment

of

^rtstanding liability based upon the Findings of Fact heretofore
Entered in this matter.
Dated this

J

day of February, 1988.

SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H

rvv.*'*^ ^..jur*' cry
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage
prepaid, to the following, this

/D

dav of February, 1988:

Ellen M. Maycock
Attorney for Plaintiff
136 S. Main Street #620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Craig M. Peterson
Attorney for Defendant
426 South 500 East

Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

fXtAtO i&,i<P£

EXHIBIT "C"

FILED JMCU-RK'S OFFICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT^
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DECREE OF DIVORCE

DOUGLAS C. STEPHENS,

CIVIL NO. D-86-3421

Plaintiff,
vs.
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS,
Defendant.

The above matter came before the Court for trial on Monday,
the 23rd day of November, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., and
continuing

thereafter

until

Daniels, Judge presiding.

concluded,

the

Honorable

Scott

The plaintiff was present in person

and represented by counsel, Ellen Maycock.

The defendant was

present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson.
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in this matter does now enter its Decree of
Divorce, as follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Each of the parties are granted a Decree of Divorce

against the other dissolving the marriage entered into between
them.
2.

The defendant is awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of the minor children, McKinley Stephens and McCall
Stephens, subject to certain parental rights and visitation being
reserved in the plaintiff, as follows:
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Plaintiff shall have the right of visitation every

other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.;
every Thursday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; and one additional
day every other week from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., with plaintiff
to pick up the children from day care on those weekdays.
(b)

Every other holiday on New Year's Day, President's

Day, Martin Luther King's birthday, Memorial Day,

Independence

Day, Pioneer Day and Labor Day.

entitled

(c)

Father's Day each year.

(d)

In every odd-numbered year, the plaintiff shall be

to exercise visitation

from Wednesday

at

6:00

p.m.

to

for the Thanksgiving
Sunday

at 6:00

p.m.,

holidays
and for

Easter or spring vacation from 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the
commencement of the holiday to 6:00 p.m. on the day preceding the
children's return to school.
(e)

Plaintiff

shall

be

entitled

Christmas Day from 12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

to

visitation

on

The plaintiff shall

also have visitation for one-half of the Christmas holidays which
will be December 26th at 9:00 a.m. through December 29th at 6:00
p.m., or December 30th at 9:00 a.m. through January 2nd at 6:00
p.m.

(unless January

2nd

is a school day, in which event the

visitation shall conclude on January 1st at 6:00 p.m.)

In the

years in which plaintiff has visitation beginning December 26th,
the children shall remain with him from Christmas Day through the
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holiday

shall

visitation

be

divided

between the parties so that each of them will exercise the latter
half of the holiday visitation to coincide with their exercise of
the New Year's Day holiday with the children.
(f)
visitation

Plaintiff shall be entitled to exercise extended

with

the

children

for

two

weeks

on

two

occasions

during the children's summer vacation from school.
(g)

When the children are out of school for recess at

times other than those already specifically mentioned (i.e., UEA
break, deer hunt), plaintiff shall have preference over day care
for care of the children during the day time for such school
recess if the defendant plans on using day care during those
times.
(h)
the

option

during

When defendant

to be

such

first

travel

by

travels the plaintiff

alternative
the

to

care

defendant.

shall have

for the

Defendant

children

will

make

reasonable efforts to provide reasonable notice to plaintiff of
her travel plans.
(i)

Defendant shall make provision for the plaintiff

to participate in elective medical decisions for the benefit of
the

children.

Plaintiff's

attendance

at

school programs

and

parent/teacher conferences and his participation or attendance at
the children's social activities, i.e., dance recitals, sports
activities.

(j)
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Each of the parties shall be enjoined from saying

anything to anyone to undermine the authority of the other parent
over the children.
3.

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of

$225.00 per month per child as child support for the benefit of
the minor children of the parties.

Each of the parties shall

have the right to claim one of the children as an exemption for
income tax purposes. When one of the children reaches the age of
majority,

the

parties

shall

claim

the

remaining

child

in

alternate years.
4.

The plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and dental

insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties so
long as it is available through her place of employment.

In the

event health and dental insurance should no longer be available
through plaintiff's place of employment, each of the parties
shall pay one-half of any costs of health and dental insurance.
Each of the parties are ordered to pay one-half of any and all
costs for health and dental care which are not paid for by
insurance benefits.
5.

There shall be no award of alimony in this matter.

6.

An

order

shall

marital estate as follows:

be

entered

making division

of the
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ASSETS
Item

Plaintiff

Linden Avenue
Maple Hills
Reeves Terrace No. 1
Reeves Terrace No. 2
Iron Blossom Lodge
Park City

$45,000.00

Defendant
$45,000.00

21,500.00
15,000.00
3,000.00
52,000.00

Household furnishings

10,671.00

1986 Isuzu
1982 Volkswagen
Sailboat
Jet Ski
Trailer
Snowplow

10,175.00

11,225.00
-01,600.00
1,400.00

Pension
Tax refunds (1985 & 1986)

19,573.00
-0-

BMW sale
Toyota sale
Cash in escrow
Cash to plaintiff

14,500.00
15,750.00
LIABILITIES

Item

Plaintiff

Richard E. Stephens
CFS (Linden first mortgage)
Mays (Linden second mortgage)
Utah State Credit Union
(Reeves No. 1)
N. Solomon (Maple Hills first)
Utah State Credit Union (Isuzu)
E. Reynolds (Park City)
LSI Trust (Reeves Terrace #2)
R.E. Stephens
J. Miller (Volkswagen)
N. Solomon (cash to plaintiff)
Cottonwood Security Bank
(plaintiff's overdraft)

$ 8,000.00
32,455.00
4,064.00
21,175.00

Defendant

$34,348.00
7,790.00
48,881.00
14,947.00
860.00
2,000.00
3,000.00
1,769.00
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Plaintiff

Cottonwood Security Bank
(defendant•s overdraft)
Credit cards (plaintiff's
personal charges)
Property taxes
7.

Defendant
1,441.00

1,964.00
3,544.00

The marital residence on Gundersen Lane shall be sold,

with the area rugs to be included in the sale and the proceeds
shall be used to equalize the division of the marital estate.
After payment of the first mortgage, the equity will be paid
first for the expenses of sale, including any expenses of the
defendant to make the house ready for sale, plus real estate fees
and all closing costs.

Second, defendant shall be reimbursed for

counseling fees in the amount of $300.00.

Then, the outstanding

liability owed to Joe and Wanda May for a promissory note signed
by the defendant shall be paid.

Until such time as the Mays are

paid, the parties shall be required to execute a trust deed on
the Gundersen Lane property as security for that outstanding
debt.

Following payment to the Mays, the plaintiff shall then

receive the first $15,750.00 of the proceeds of the sale to
equalize the marital estate and any balance remaining thereafter
will be divided equally between the parties.
8.

Until the Gundersen Lane property is sold, it should

continue to be used by the defendant as her residence and she
shall make all payments, pay all utilities and receive the rents
from said property.

The defendant shall be responsible for the
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sale of the property, both listing

it and selling it.

The

defendant may sell the property at any price that she finds
reasonable; however, the plaintiff shall have the right of first
refusal prior to sale.

Defendant shall give notice to plaintiff

of the terms of the sale, and plaintiff shall then have an
opportunity to buy it at the price for which defendant intends to
sell it.
9.

Defendant shall be awarded the present cash value of

her retirement plan.
10.

The

furniture,

furnishings

and

fixtures

and

other

personal property shall be awarded to each of the parties as they
have

divided

it,

except

that

the

rosewood

hutch

shall

be

delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff, and the desk and
credenza should be delivered to the plaintiff by the defendant.
The defendant shall also receive the needlepoint seat which she
made, but the plaintiff will be entitled to retain the rocker.
The defendant shall receive the walnut frames. The roll-top desk
shall be sold immediately and the proceeds from the sale divided
equally between the parties.

Duplicates shall be made of the

slides and photographs in possession of each of the parties, and
each of them are ordered to divide equally the cost of preparing
the duplicates.
11.

The parties shall share equally in any recovery from

the Larsen Judgment, and each of them is directed to pay one-half
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of the attorney's fees incurred for obtaining and/or collecting
the Judgment.
12.

The defendant shall be awarded Judgment for past due

child support in the amount of $450.00 through November 30, 1987.
13.

Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and

attorney's fees which they have incurred in this matter, except
that the Court finds that the necessity of having two hearings on
the issue of plaintiff's transfer of title to the Maple Hills
property was not necessary, and the defendant shall pay $350.00
for the benefit of plaintiff's attorney's fees.

The payment of

said $350.00 attorney's fees shall be made from the distribution
of the proceeds of the sale to plaintiff prior to dividing the
shares between the parties.
Dated this

'—

day of February, 1988.

SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Wv--'" ATTEST
H. WXOM HtfOLEY

Depmy (tor*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Decree
/0

of

Divorce,

postage

prepaid,

day of February, 1988:

Ellen M. Maycock
Attorney for Plaintiff
136 S. Main Street #620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Craig M. Peterson
Attorney for Defendant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Jyikv^

ihuxU

to

the

CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
•ooOooDOUGLAS C. STEPHENS,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
SHANNON DALE STEPHENS,
Case No. 880600-CA
District Court Case No. D86-3421

Defendant/Appellant.

ooOoo
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered
four true and correct copies of APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Ellen
Maycock, Attorney for Respondent, 136 South Main Street, #620,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, the day and year set forth below.
DATED this

day of February, 1989.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

By:

'Ji&f. #< / Z ^

TEl
pRAIG/M. PETERSON
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant
33645

-1-

KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ELLEN MAYCOCK

EIGHTH FLOOR, VALLEY TOWER
50 WEST BROADWAY (300 SOUTH)
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

March20,1989

TELEPHONE (801) 531-7090
TELECOPY (801)359-3954

[V'> y

^'"q

Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Stephens v. Stephens
Case No. 880600-CA
Dear Ms. Noonan:
We represent Douglas Stephens, the respondent in the above-entitled appeal.
Mr. Stephens has decided that he does not wish to contest the relief sought on appeal
by appellant. Accordingly, he is willing that the above-entitled matter be remanded
to the district court for modification of the decree of divorce in accordance with the
relief sought in appellant's brief. Accordingly, we will not be filing a brief on behalf
of respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK

Ellen Maycock
EM:vs
cc:

Douglas Stephens
Craig M. Peterson, Esq.

